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ABSTRACT
This article searches for the types of contestation that arise to an EU
presence in a regionwhere the EU is not a dominant actor, like in the
Arctic. The issue areas that this article focuses on are environmental
protection, indigenous people’s rights, and (sustainable) economic
development. The article presents a critical discourse analysis of
the national strategy documents of EU member states, non-EU
Arctic Council members and non-EU, non-Arctic observers of the
Arctic Council from a discourse-historical approach. Through this
analysis, the article focuses on normative/political and external/
internal contestation to the EU stance represented through EU
policies, positions, priorities and norms. This article concludes that
there are different types of contestation to the EU from different
sources in each policy area. In each of these cases of contestation,
the EU makes an explicit decision about which source of
contestation to engagewith and about which types to remain silent.
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The Arctic is a region with a simple problem but a complex agenda. The stability of
the region has been challenged primarily by climate change and the melting of the ice.
This bears the potential for shorter maritime routes between East Asia and Northern
Europe and North America. The melting of the ice also revealed that the region is rich
on resources that trigger greed of both private firms and public authorities to use
them to their utmost commercial benefit. All these, result in a situation where the
Arctic states compete with each other on maximizing their (legally) allocated
shares, and non-Arctic states want to be players in this game of competition. The
indigenous peoples of the region are deprived of their traditional ways of life and
try to survive to the best of their capabilities in a political and economic environment
not of their own making. The Arctic Council (AC), as the main forum of dialogue in
the region, has three EU member states (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), two Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA) members (Norway and Iceland) and six observers from
the EU (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Poland- and previously the
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UK). Its non-European observers are China, India, South Korea and Japan. Russia,
Canada and the US, as Arctic countries, have different preferences on different
issue areas.
This article focuses on the issue areas of environmental protection, indigenous
people’s rights and (sustainable) economic development. The multiplicity of actors
and their diverging interests on these issues, as well as the variety of norms that they
uphold in this region, make the Arctic a perfect case study to analyse the sources of con-
testation to EU’s external policies through a multi-level (EU member states / indigenous
populations and international/global) and multi-issue example.
This article searches for the reasons and sources of contestation to an EU stance in a
region where the EU is not a dominant actor, like in the Arctic. In this aspect, it contrib-
utes to the Special Issue by demonstrating where the contestation to the EU comes from
in this region, and how it is justified by the actors that voice this contestation. To pursue
this analysis, the article looks at the national strategies of various actors in the region that
all differ in their relationship with the EU. From a Foucauldian perspective, the article
sees this conversation between the national strategy documents of the prominent
actors of the region as an inter-textual discursive event that needs to be analysed from
a discourse historical approach. The analysis is based on two conceptual foundations
that focus on norm diffusion and political and normative contestation, embodied in con-
testation against EU policies and norms.
After introducing its theoretical framework and methodology for analysing contesta-
tion, this article will proceed by analysing contestation to EU presence in the Arctic in
the policy areas of environmental protection, economic development and indigenous
peoples rights. A multi-level analysis of political and normative contestation to the EU
in these selected policy areas will be followed by a conclusion on the nature of contestation
to the EU in these areas and its implications for the EU’s “less traditional” foreign policies.
Conceptualizing challenges to EU presence in the Arctic
Earlier works on the EU at the institutions of global governance is a valuable starting
point to assess the EU’s experience of contestation in the governance of the Arctic
region. Some of the earlier works have conceptualized how the EU’s performance can
be defined, categorized and assessed (Jorgensen, Oberthür, & Shahin, 2011), others
have focused on how the EU functions and pursues its own position at institutions of
global governance like at the United Nations (UN) (Laatikainen & Smith 2006; Rasch,
2008), at the G20 (Debaere, 2015), the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Young,
2011), and EU in the Arctic Council (Burke, 2019; Raspotnik, 2018). This article
engages with the EU’s presence in Arctic governance through the contestation it faces
in this region on a variety of issue areas. It engages with the literature on contestation
to the EU through two main dichotomies: Internal versus external contestation to the
EU policies, norms and values in the Arctic, and political versus normative contestation
regarding the stance upheld by the EU.
Schmidt’s (2019) categorization as “politics against policy” i.e. how the EU engages
with a certain policy issue, and “politics against polity”, i.e. resistance against the EU
per se, or its institutions, forms the basis of this article’s approach to political contestation
to the EU’s presence in the Arctic. Moreover, political contestation and the authority
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embedded into the EU are closely linked (Costa, 2019). This categorization enables the
article to also differentiate between normative contestation to the values and regulations
the EU is upholding and political contestation against the EU’s claim to an authority over
the issue areas in this region. Zürn (2019)’s call for a merging of the analysis regarding
politicization at national, EU and global levels to understand the dynamics of politiciza-
tion is what this article does by taking into account four levels by including also the sub-
national (i.e. indigenous) level.
The dynamics of norm creation and norm diffusion, and political and normative con-
testation in international organizations frame this article’s search for the sources and
legitimization of contestation to the EU in the Arctic region. Creation of new norms is
a contestation of the old order in itself (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The processes of
diffusion of alternative norms is a competition on whose norms will eventually prevail
(Checkel, 2001). Contestation of norms is sometimes a healthy process (Wiener, 2014)
and sometimes a challenge to the functioning (Weiss, 2013) or the legitimacy of the
system of governance (Zürn, 2018). Zürn (2018)’s focus on the linkage between authority
and legitimacy of international organizations demonstrate that the challenges by rising
powers or changing domestic opinions result in either deepening of an existing organiz-
ation or the emergence of counter-institutionalization. Preferences of different actors for
alternative institutions in the region is the most significant aspect of contestation to the
EU, as this article demonstrates.
Since the EU does not hold a position of power or political leverage in this region, as it
usually does in other parts of its neighbourhood like Eastern Europe or the Mediterra-
nean, it is much easier for external contestation to be expressed (Raspotnik, 2018). On
the other hand, since the EU does not have a regulating authority on the other actors
of this region, it should also not be on the target of political or normative contestation
(Costa, 2019; Zürn, 2018). The differences in the lived experiences of the actors in the
region also legitimize the upholding of different interests. As explained by Wiener
(2014), this is a struggle for “the power to define the meaning-in-use of the norms
that govern a political community”, based on their “difference of experience, expectation
and opinion” (pp. 10–11). The Arctic is not a single political community, but a geo-
graphically squeezed region, whose governance requires tight collaboration and close
cooperation between regional partners. Multiple agents aim for the diffusion of their
own norms in this region, and the EU is only one of them. The next section explains
how these two bases of contestation to the EU (normative and political) coming from
at least two levels (internal and external) on the selected issue areas of environmental
protection, indigenous peoples’ rights and (sustainable) economic development are to
be analysed.
Methodology: a discourse-historical approach to multi-level contestation
in the Arctic
This article firstly charts the EU presence in the Arctic by outlining four categories of EU
stance : EU policies (solid areas of EU policy-making, where EU institutions are involved
in creating the acquis on the issue), EU positions (common positions taken by the EU
during negotiations in international fora, or positions taken by individual EU institutions
like the European Parliament (EP), which have not [yet] been transformed into a solid
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policy outcome), EU priorities (declared through usage of this term by either the Euro-
pean Commission or the Higher Representative (HR) in their relevant communication
documents about a certain subject, in this case, the Arctic region) and EU norms (inter-
national treaties -or other forms of norms that uphold a certain value such as democracy
-upheld by the EU during international negotiations with third parties on related
subjects).
The EU’s stance on the selected issue areas are covered through the analysis of three
main documents: The Council Conclusions of December 2019 and the 2016 Joint Com-
munication on An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic written by the Euro-
pean Commission and the HR are taken as the main framework documents. The third
document is the EP (2017) Resolution, which mostly displays the normative contestation
by the EP on the content of EU’s Arctic policy pursued by the Commission and the HR.1
As will be shown below, the EP generally has higher expectations from an EU presence in
the Arctic and is more outspoken about which norms should be upheld and which pol-
icies should be further developed. Taking the collective EU stance as a given, the article
then searches in the official Arctic strategy documents of the selected countries for con-
testation to the EU stance due to two potential reasons: either because others (EU
member states, other Arctic countries, non-EU observer countries of the Arctic
Council) have adopted interests that the EU positions, policies, priorities or norms
hinder, i.e. political contestation on interests, or because the EU policies, positions, pri-
orities and norms contradict the norms favoured by others and the EU is being urged to
comply with these standards or norms, i.e. normative contestation.
As shown earlier in the relevant literature, the authority embedded in organizations,
and in our case, the EU, is a major determinant of future contestation. Thus, it is a sig-
nificant starting point to show how much authority the EU has with respect to the three
issue areas, and for whom its authority forms a legal constraint or a political challenge.
These will be outlined at the start of the analysis in each section below. Following this
initial EU- level chart, the article looks at the Arctic policy/strategy documents of a
select group of its member states: These are the three AC members Denmark, Sweden
and Finland, and two AC observer countries Germany and France, which are chosen
for the sake of them being the two biggest member states with large economies and sig-
nificant military power bearing the role of political leadership that make them potentially
significant actors in the Arctic among other member states of the EU. For purposes of
space limitation and focus, the Arctic policies of four other AC-observer EU member
states2 are not included in this analysis.
Building on the inner EU dynamics and positions of EU member states, the analysis is
then expanded to have a look at the positions of non-EU Arctic Council member states,
namely Norway, Iceland, Russia, Canada and the US. Afterwards, the relevant documents
of the non-Arctic, non-EU observer states of the AC have been analysed in the same
manner as described above. The selected countries for this group include the three
Asian countries China, Japan and South Korea, as well as the UK.3 Last, but not least,
two main international legal texts (ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples and UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) as well as policy pos-
itions declared by the Sami Council have been included in the multi-level analysis.
This article presents a critical discourse analysis of the strategy/policy documents of
the relevant parties based on the discourse-historical approach. Discourse-historical
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approach enables us to see the socio-philosophical orientations of different actors
involved in the region and facilitates our search for the reasons of contestation to
the EU stance, by looking into “the historical sources and background of the social
and political fields in which discursive events are embedded” (Wodak, 2011, p. 64).
The historical approach enables us to see the discourse of the documents as constructs
of a certain historical and cultural context (Holzscheiter, 2014). From a Foucauldian
understanding of discourse, such government strategy documents also structure
thoughts and decisions of the policy makers that eventually bear consequences on
the objects of these policies (Keskitalo, 2015, p. 422). Keskitalo’s stress on being
“schooled in certain ways of being and thinking” (p.422-3) shows how certain ways
framing knowledge shapes the dominant discourse. Critical Discourse Analysis is
suited in this respect also for analysing the relationship between these different
“texts” (Meyer, 2011, p. 15).
These documents are mostly published in English4 and therefore consciously cater to a
foreign audience. However, they also have the purpose of outlining the next steps to be
followed by national bureaucracies, and therefore explicitly engage in producing the pol-
icies Keskitalo (2015, p. 422) mentions. Each of these documents (n=20) have been coded
by hand with respect to their support and / or contestation of the EU stance on the three
issues areas outlined in the first stage of the research. The coding also included national
positions on geopolitics and other relevant issues where a strong and clear language
emphasized what their national preferences are with respect to the Arctic region.
Lastly, the initially outlined EU stance has then been analysed in four rounds with the
aim of charting the contestation from 1. EU member states, 2. non-EU Arctic Council
members, and 3. Non-Arctic, non- EU states 4. Indigenous communities on the three
selected issue areas. All these data are eventually brought together to explain what
types of contestation to the EU originate from inside the EU and what types from
outside the EU. The conclusion rests on the comparison of these specific findings
from the three issue areas.
Environmental protection
Environmental degradation in the Arctic and the melting of ice worsen implications of
climate change. Therefore this section on environmental protection does not only deal
with protection of the environment and biodiversity in a narrow sense but also includes
policies on climate change mitigation in this region. These policies also have implications
for economic development. Therefore, national entitlements, freedoms and responsibil-
ities of individual states come to the fore, as will be explained below.
EU policies on climate change bind the member states towards realizing certain goals
and unify the member states’ norms on the levels agreed at the EU internally (Oberthür,
2019). The EU’s environmental policy is a mixed-competence area, which means that
member states and the EU both have certain competences. By its nature, EU regulations
and directives are binding on the member states, as well as the EEA members like
Norway and Iceland for their access to the internal market, so long as the EEA agreement
does not deviate from this general line in specific matters, like fisheries.5 Table 1 shows
the EU policies/positions/priorities and norms of the EU according to the three key
official documents mentioned above.
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This table shows that as the EU is indeed committed to environmental protection in
the Arctic region, and that the EP (2017) has higher aims with respect to this priority area
than those upheld by the Commission and HR. The EP is also in favour of upholding fora
where the EU and European states have a strong representation on the global stage.
Three rounds of analysis of , firstly EU member states’ strategic documents, secondly
those of non-EU Arctic states, and thirdly of non-Arctic, non-EU AC observers show that
within this issue area contestation lies in the choice of institutionalization of the mech-
anisms for the protection of the environment. All Arctic states agree that there should be
a legally binding international agreement on fishing rights and responsibilities in areas
that fall beyond national jurisdiction. Whether this should be an additional agreement
to the UNCLOS or be framed separately is one issue area of contestation between
actors, which prefer to see UNCLOS further strengthened and others like the US that
would rather keep away from UNCLOS-related institutions.
There are also bilateral cooperation agreements in this issue area like the Finland-
Russia Arctic Partnership on Energy or the Norway-Russia Joint Environmental
Monitor. Whether there should be further regulations in the extraction industries or pre-
vention of pollution is a preference for some countries like Denmark (Denmark, Green-
land and the Faroe Islands, n.d.) and France (Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du
Developpement International, 2016), while others are silent on this issue.
Freedom of navigation is a significant right upheld by all parties, whereas some of
them such as Canada, Russia, the US and Korea are especially engaged in icebreaking
activities for this purpose. The Arctic Five (Russia, the US, Canada, Norway and
Denmark) have announced in the Ilulissat Declaration (2008)7 that the UNCLOS is
the regulatory framework for delimitation of territorial waters, exclusive economic
zones and continental shelves in the Arctic region. Norway has taken its continental
shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles limit by regulations of the UNCLOS Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Denmark, Canada and Russia have
Table 1. EU stance on climate change and protection of the environment in the Arctic.




- based on UNFCCC
and Paris agreement
targets





EP (2017) – calls for a
drilling ban on Arctic (icy)
waters of the EU and EEA
EP (2017) – users of natural




These positions of EP not
held up by European
Commission or the
Council
Priority area designated by
Joint Communication
Contribute to international
efforts (including that of AC
task force) to limit emissions
of black carbon and
methane. (European
Commission and HR, 2016)
Self-ascribed duty to protect
the Arctic environment and
ecosystem. (European
Commission and HR, 2016)
Support for an instrument
under UNCLOS for
conservation and
sustainable use of marine
biodiversity (protected




EP (2017) – supports
establishment of a marine
protected area in Arctic High
Seas under mandate of the
OSPAR Commission,6 where
the EU is stronger for
prohibiting all extractive
activities
Source: author’s own compilation.
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applied for doing the same (CBC News, 2019, May 27). Russia sees these efforts by all
these countries and the decision by the CLCS as violations of its interests in the Arctic
region (Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation, 2020). The EU upholds the
UNCLOS but is silent on these contestations among different states. One major challenge
of UNCLOS is of course to the US, which has not become a party to the Convention so
far. Hence, the rights announced in the Ilulissat Declaration can be upheld for the US
only through their accession to the UNCLOS8. The declaration of the Arctic Five
makes the charting of territories under national jurisdictions a matter for them alone
in the Arctic region, where they individually decide whether to apply to CLCS or
search for other agreements.
The privileged right of the eight AC member states9 to grant observer status to other
countries (and the EU) on a conditional basis that is constantly being scrutinized turns
the Arctic Council into the status of a club (Burke, 2019). The EU’s observer status in the
Arctic Council is the major contestation the EU faces in the Arctic. The EU’s application
for an observer status in the Arctic Council has not been formally accepted. The decision
of acceptance was formerly vetoed by Canada due to the EU’s ban on seal products. After
the reaching of an agreement that allowed the seal products of indigenous production to
be traded into the EU, Canada has lifted its veto. But now Russia continues to veto EU’s
formal observer status due to EU sanctions following the Crimean annexation of Russia.
So the EU remains only a de-facto observer of the AC.
All these findings show that on the issue of environmental protection the main chal-
lenge for the EU is external political contestation on the choice of institutions. EU’s
official support to UNCLOS shows that the EU chooses to accommodate these external
preferences and downplays the EP’s position favouring the OSPAR Commission. None
of the actors of the region negates the norms upheld by these relevant organizations.
Their contestation stems from their relative positions with respect to these separate
organizations.
Indigenous people’s rights
Indigenous peoples’ rights can be seen as part of the general promotion of human rights
or of the protection of minorities by the EU. There are several international mechanisms
created for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. The EU is not a party to any
one of these mechanisms itself, but some of its member states are. The International
Labour Organization (ILO)’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People’s,
adopted in 1989, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP), adopted in 2007, are the two main international legal frameworks that
govern indigenous rights globally. UNDRIP has been adopted at the United Nations
General Assembly by 144 countries, and is, as such, a non-binding declaration,
whereas the ILO Convention 169 is an international treaty that its parties ratify. The
ILO Convention 169, was only ratified by Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway and Spain among the European countries (ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples, 1989), whereas the UNDRIP was initially opposed only by Canada
and the US. Russia had abstained. The US and Canada later changed their positions to
support the Declaration (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.).
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The Sami populations of Sweden and Finland are the only recognized indigenous
people of the EU -but the Sami also live in Norway and Russia-, since the Inuit of Green-
land fell out of the EU’s scope due to Greenland’s exit from the EC’s jurisdiction in 1985.
The specific needs of the indigenous peoples actually require a significant commitment
on the part of the EU and its member states. Table 2 shows that indigenous rights are
not designated as a priority area by the EU for its Arctic policy in the Joint Communi-
cation or the Council Decision, even though the EU regularly holds meetings with indi-
genous representatives. The emptiness of the column designated for priorities in Table 2
corresponds to the silence of the EU documents on designating this issue area as a
priority.
The main contestation within the EU and its member states is with regard to how
powerful the indigenous peoples should be in the making of decisions on economic
activities in the regions that they live in. The Sami Council, which represents the Sami
living in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, has adopted its own Arctic Strategy in
2019. This Strategy aims at the international recognition of Sapmi (the land where the
Sami people live) and that the Sami people are treated as equals through the “de-coloniz-
ing of the Sami society and securing the Sami people’s rights to self-determination” (Sami
Council, 2019, p. 4). It advocates “for the right of indigenous people to give or withhold
their free, prior, and informed consent in non-coercive negotiations prior to activities
being established and developed on their customary lands” (Sami Council, 2019, p. 8).
Sami populations mostly live within a traditional subsistence economy and the new
mining and resource extraction initiatives threaten their way of life and economies.
The Sami Council’s (2019) Arctic Strategy includes a valuable list of knowledge gaps
and research needs and also investment priorities that they had presented to the
Arctic Stakeholders’ Forum in 2017. This latter document shows the needs of the Sami
community on the preservation of their culture, access to education, and support of
trade opportunities for their products. They also propose a Sami representation in Brus-
sels and access to EU funding. They underline the necessity for a mechanism to ensure
that EU-funded projects and programmes, as well as EU-investments do not disrespect
indigenous peoples’ rights, and also make sure that local people are allocated some of the
Table 2. EU’s stance on indigenous people’s rights in the Arctic.
EU policy EU position Priority Norm/norm creation
Commission DG MARE organizes
dialogue between the EU and
indigenous peoples
“EU should … advanc(e)
consistency between the EU’s
internal and external policy
towards indigenous peoples”
(European Commission and the
HR, 2016, p. 15)
EP (2017) – The fundamental rights of
the indigenous peoples must be
protected with more stringent
safeguards, should have the right to
approve the extraction of natural
resources
EP (2017) – support for the UNDRIP
and especially their right to free,
prior, informed consent before
adoption and implementation of
legislative and administrative
measures
EP (2017) – suggests the
establishment of an Arctic
representation of indigenous
peoples in Brussels
EP (2017) – cites all relevant
international legal documents
and the rights mentioned in
them as references to its
Resolution
Source: author’s own compilation.
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profits from these investments. The EU commits itself to ensuring that the views and
rights of the Arctic indigenous peoples are respected and promoted in EU policies on
the Arctic (Council of the European Union, 2017; European Commission, 2016).
However, most of the actual demands of the Sami Arctic Strategy are only upheld by
the EP as shown in Table 2.
That being said on the EU position, indigenous people’s rights are being handled
differently by the actors in the region. Starting from the outside - in, the non-Arctic,
non-EU states Japan (Headquarters for Ocean Policy, 2015), Korea (Korea Maritime
Institute et al., n.d.) and China (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018)
declare their respect for indigenous peoples’ rights in the undertaking of activities they
plan for the Arctic region. On the other hand, it is the governments of the Arctic
states that eventually decide how these rights of the indigenous peoples are to be prac-
ticed or respected. At this point, there is not much difference between the EU
members and other Arctic states. Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2011) and Canada
(Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, n.d.) acknowledge their “colonial”
relationship with their indigenous peoples, promise to uphold their rights and aim at a
certain reconciliation. Denmark (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, n.d.),
underlines the autonomy of Greenland (and Faroe islands) to make their decisions on
how to develop their economy through the extraction and utilization of resources in
their territory and underlines the Greenlandic government’s own responsibility to
attract foreign investment by adoption of international legal standards. Norway (Norwe-
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014), Finland (Prime Minister’s Office (2013, 2016),
and Russia (Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation, 2020) merely mention the
existence of their indigenous populations and that their living conditions should be elev-
ated . The US mentions consultation with Alaska natives through the executive order of
the year 2000 on “consultation and coordination with Indian tribal governments”
(Executive Office of the President, 2000). Apart from being in dialogue with the indigen-
ous peoples through the Arctic Council, mostly about EU funds and EU-led investments,
the EU does not comment on the national situations of the indigenous peoples.
Indigenous peoples’ rights is an issue area that the EU has the discursive advantage
through its promotion of human rights. But all Arctic countries, including those
which are EU members or are closely affiliated with the EU, have their own sensi-
tivities about this issue area. This explains why the EU is silent on naming indigenous
peoples’ rights as a priority area for the EU. The contestation to the EU’s position on
indigenous rights is overwhelmingly internal and normative. If there had been an
internal consensus among EU members on this issue area, then the EU could have
engaged with external contestation just like it is able to do so for protection of
human rights globally. However, this is not the case with respect to indigenous
peoples’ rights.
(Sustainable)#Economic development
Economic development in the Arctic region is mainly driven by the rush to the uncov-
ered fuel and mineral resources in the region, the establishment of new navigation routes,
and the need for investing in better transport connectivity in the region. The UN Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) or investments for further economic development are
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not areas where the EU aims to create more norms in the Arctic than those that already
exist in the international arena.
Table 3 shows the policies, positions, priorities and norms upheld by the EU insti-
tutions in the area of (sustainable) economic development. This table also demonstrates
that there are no further norms that the EU officially upholds on this issue, but that the
economic development in the region is an EU priority in itself.
As part of its own activities to become engaged in the economic development of the
region, the EU outlined priority areas for investment. These priority areas were invest-
ment in digital infrastructure, internal and external transport connections, support to
development of local businesses, especially on bio-economy, renewable energy pro-
duction, sustainable tourism and suitable use of natural resources. The EU has also out-
lined funding for research on climate change, and its mitigation, adaptation to climate
change as well as development opportunities that enhance climate resilience (European
Commission, 2017).
All EU member states start their strategy documents by stating how significant sus-
tainable development and protection of the Sami livelihoods are for them. Some
member states (Sweden [Regeringskansliet, 2011]) and (Germany [The Federal Govern-
ment, 2019]) devote further space to these concerns than others (France [Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres et du Developpement International, 2016]). However, all member
states declare in detail that they want to have the best of the mining, drilling and invest-
ment opportunities that the region presented. Many of them (Finland [Althingi, 2011]),
and Denmark [Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, n.d.]) also openly call for
foreign investments into the region and plan on creating conducive regulatory environ-
ments to facilitate foreign direct investments (FDI). Finland cooperates extensively with
the Russian mining and energy sectors. The Danish government explicitly frames the rev-
enues of the mineral resources sector to be taken by Greenland’s self-government as a
way of paving the way for their financial independence, and alleviating burden from
the Danish budget (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, n.d.).
Table 3. EU stance on (sustainable) economic development in the Arctic.




through Arctic Council and
UN. EU welcomes
initiatives and actions of
its member states (Council
of the European Union,
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The non-Arctic member states are not less ambitious, France (Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres et du Developpement International, 2016) declares that they need to ensure
security of strategic minerals from the region, which are vital for their high-tech
defence sector. France also suggests that the energy resources of the region should be
integrated into the EU’s energy security strategy, which has not materialized until
today. Germany (The Federal Government, 2019) is the only member state that supports
legally binding regulations on extraction of mineral resources, a complete ban on heavy
fuel oil as in Antarctica, rejects use of nuclear-powered applications, and commits to
further designation of protected areas without economic use among Arctic states (i.e.
also in areas within national jurisdictions).
Among non-EU Arctic states, Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014)
and the US (President of the United States, 2013, 2014) are positioned similar to EU
states’ approach towards enhancing their own opportunities in the region for commercial
gains, resources and improving connectivity. Iceland (Althingi, 2011), Canada (Canada’s
Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, n.d.) and Russia (Presidential Decree of the
Russian Federation, 2020) have more inward-looking documents focused on their own
developmental goals. Iceland would like to promote trade and business opportunities
within the Arctic region. Canada is almost entirely focused on reconciling with their
three indigenous groups, the Inuit, the Métis and the First Nations in their development
projects.
Russian documents mention the country’s need of further (foreign) investments as its
major problem (Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation, 2020; Russian Federation,
2008). Cooperation with Finland and Norway may be partially catering to this need.
Russia plans for establishment of further transport and communication lines along the
Northern Sea Route10, with a clear preference for state management of the socio-econ-
omic development in the region. South Korea is very much interested in the commercia-
lization of the Northern Sea Route (Korea Maritime Institute et al., n.d.). China (State
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018) and Japan (Headquarters for Ocean
Policy, 2015) also see that this route is their shortest way into the Atlantic Ocean,
which make all three of them partners for Russia, whereas Western investments stand
at a distance due to sanctions on Russia.
Economic opportunities are the main reason why non- Arctic states are interested in this
region. All of the four countries analysed have rather solid plans about what they would like
to do in this region. China would like to build a “Polar Silk Road” (State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 2018) in addition to its famous Belt and Road initiative11,
whereas the UK plans to offer financial services (especially maritime insurance) for
businesses investing in the Arctic region. The UK also contributes to shaping many govern-
ance frameworks through initiatives such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights in the Extractive Industries, and the Extractives Industries Transparency
Initiative, which apply to mines in the Arctic and elsewhere (HM Government, 2018).
All of the non-Arctic actors agree that fishing in the high seas of the Arctic should be a
regulated right for all, with the resources of the region being protected by an inter-
national agreement. The UK contribution to governance through creation of new
norms on extractive industries makes the UK a potential ally for the EU in general for
the future efforts for regulation. However, the fact that this regulation is most urgently
needed in the area of fishing would probably not make the EU regulations the favourable
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choice for the UK, Norway, and Iceland that want to stay detached from the EU on
fisheries.
These findings show us that the main contestation for the EU in the area of upholding
(sustainable) economic development is normative and external. Even though the EU’s
own regulations on (sustainable) economic development and protection of the environ-
ment inclusive of extractive industries are binding on its member states, the rest of the
Arctic actors have no desire to be bound by EU regulations. This situation makes the
EU’s internal normative influence fade away in the region. The Danish government’s
call for neoliberal FDI norms to be the prevalent force of Greenlandic economic devel-
opment is illustrative of this point.
Market forces and preferences of the industry become therefore the major drivers of
economic development in the Arctic region. As illustrated by the establishment of the
Arctic Economic Council (AEC) during Canada’s 2013-2015 Chairmanship of the
Arctic Council, state interests are intertwined with interests shown to the region by
businesses. However, AEC is an independent business organization that seems to
respect indigenous populations more than some AC states do when linking large and
small businesses from AC member states and the AC member indigenous organizations
with non-Arctic businesses (Arctic Economic Council, 2020).12
Conclusion
The basic norms of climate change mitigation, sustainable development goals, and
respect for indigenous rights are accepted by all governments that have any interests
in the Arctic region, at least rhetorically. The discourse historical approach used in this
article, however, reveals that with respect to recognition and protection of indigenous
peoples’ rights, the policy of each country depends on how they have framed their
relationship with their own indigenous populations through history, as shown
through the examples of Canada and Sweden compared with those of Denmark,
Finland, or Russia. This historical framing of the relationship then determines how
the extraction industries are to be regulated: The Danish example prioritizes an expec-
tation from the Greenlandic government for passing FDI friendly regulations and
raising of its revenues instead of protective regulations on environment or preser-
vation of traditional livelihoods of the Greenlandic population. The Russian
example favours strong state control on the socio-economic development of the
region.
Outsiders to the region, whose policies are not historically shaped through a power
relationship with these indigenous communities draw their own rhetoric in a manner
that would ‘fit’ the actors they find most beneficial to engage with. The chosen Asian
actors, South Korea, China and Japan cooperate with Russia for the investments and
navigation routes across the Northern Sea Route. The UK approaches industries
through provision of services like insurance for navigation and regulation of extractive
industries. The EU, however, chooses to engage with all Arctic countries and all Arctic
communities. The historical relationships of its members with their Sami populations
limit policy options of the EU, whereas the EU’s own history of upholding human and
minority rights as well as its standards of environmental protection make the EU a
favourable actor in its relations with the Sami communities, and enables the EP to
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support the demands of the Sami communities, as the EU’s only recognized indigenous
population.
Within such a historically-set power relationship observable through official dis-
courses, the above analysis of these three distinct issue areas with respect to contestation
to the EU reveals that on environmental protection the contestion is institutional, there-
fore political, and external to the EU; on (sustainable) economic development, normative
and external; and with respect to indigenous rights, the contestation is normative and
internal. A comparative analysis of how the EU has formulated its policies under such
circumstances reveals some interesting findings about how the EU tackles different
types of contestation:
The EU faces paralysis in the case of internal normative contestation and cannot pursue
global policies that go beyond the least common denominator across its member states.
However, in its own bilateral relationships with the indigenous peoples’ organizations,
the EU adheres to principles of respect and support that would not disturb its member
states. The true normative standing on indigenous peoples’ concerns is upheld by the
EP. Unlike the Commission or the HR, the EP’s position is facilitated with the fact that
it does not need to bear the burden of intra-EU tensions across member states. This
lack of political burden enables the EP to become the voice of the ‘Normative Power
Europe’ that would be expected of the EU in its entirety. The absence of internal political
burden as a facilitator of voice is worth looking further into in future research on issues
relating to EU’s engagement with normative contestation.
Where the contestation from the outside is about extension of EU’s internal regu-
lations to geographies beyond the EU in the Arctic region, the EU seems to be unable
to export its internal norms. This finding runs contrary to the experience of the EU in
other areas in its immediate neighbourhood like the candidate countries, Eastern Part-
nership or the Mediterranean.13 The main difference from these cases is that the EU is
not the actor determining the rules of access to the ‘club’ in the Arctic region and its pres-
ence in the AC depends on the convenience of the AC member states, as shown by the
Russian and Canadian vetoes. This case shows us that the EU is only able to export its
internal norms to other countries/regions where it is on the stronger side of an asym-
metric relationship.
This brings us to the first case study on the environmental protection in the Arctic
where the contestation is external and political with respect to competing institutions
that could regulate on issues relating to the law of the sea and use of natural resources
beyond national jurisdictions. In the face of external political contestation, in a region
where the EU is not the dominant actor, the EU has chosen to promote the most
widely favoured institution (UNCLOS Commission) among the several options that
existed, including bilateralism between the major actors, rather than pursuing an
option (OSPAR Commission) that may leverage its own interests but antagonize
others. In this case, the EU has adopted a normative response to political contestation
by choosing institutionalized multilateralism over bilateralism through supporting the
most favoured institution among the other actors. Further comparative research employ-
ing the discourse-historical approach should be done with respect to different types of
contestation that the EU faces, in order to reveal further patterns about how historically




1. For a background reading of the processes of evolution of the positions by each of the EU
institutions as well as that of the HR/VP, see Andreas Raspotnik (2018).
2. The Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Poland are the other EU member states that are observers
in the AC (Arctic Council, 2020).
3. Other non-Arctic, non-EU observers of the AC include Switzerland, India and Singapore
(Arctic Council, 2020).
4. All of these documents except the Russian ones have been published (also) in English. The
two Russian documents (the Bases of State Policy, 2020 and the Foundations of State Policy,
2035) were published only in Russian. They have been translated via google translate and
have been read in combination with the SIPRI Comment (Klimenko, 2020) and The
NATO Defence College document review (Buchanan, 2020) written specifically on these
documents.
5. Fisheries is a policy area where Norway and Iceland derogate from the EU acquis perma-
nently and retain their national legislation. For more on this subject, see Gstöhl (1994).
6. For further information on what the OSPAR Commission is see, OSPAR Commission
(n.d.).
7. The Ilulissat Declaration was adopted at the Arctic Ocean Conference initiated by the
Danish and Greenlandic governments and took place on 27-29 May 2008 in Greenland,
Ilulissat.
8. At that time the US, under Obama administration had announced that it would work
towards acceding to the UNCLOS. President of the United States (2014).
9. The US, Canada, Russia, Denmark and Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland.
10. Northern Sea Route is the official name of the Russian Arctic Coast.
11. One Belt, One Road has been at the centre of China’s foreign infrastructure investments
since its launch as the ‘New Silk Road’ in 2013. For more on China’s initiative see, Alice
Ekman (2015), ‘China reshaping the Global Order?’ EU ISS Issue Alert, 24 July;
12. For more on the work of AEC, and how they seem to successfully include indigenous econ-
omies and traditional knowledge alongside other Arctic business interests in a non-political
setting, see https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/
13. As an example of the vast literature on the influence of the EU beyond its borders see
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009).
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